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“Understanding how proposed policy interventions will affect the 
power and political interests of the stakeholders is a vital consideration, 
since all policy interventions occur in a social context characterized by a 
delicate mix of informal organizations, networks, and institutions”
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1. Introduction
At a time when technological innovations are making our world 
increasingly smaller and our production systems are becoming increasingly 
more efficient, the benefits of economic growth and development as a whole 
have not been able to reach all of society. Indeed, many poor countries, 
characterised by their disadvantageous position in the global society and 
continuously plagued by weak governments, internal strife and natural dis-
asters have missed out on many of the benefits of growth and development. 
Within countries that do gain advantage from the various developments of 
globalisation, significant groups continue to be excluded from the benefits of 
this new-found prosperity. It is quite significant that a generalised conclusion 
such as this is still a reality at the turn of the century, despite decades of na-
tional and international effort to promote development and combat poverty.
The weight of empirical evidence demands that poverty remain a 
priority of international co-operation and national policy. Although unsat-
isfactory as a measure of poverty, indicators of income poverty give a clear 
indication of the continuing persistence of poverty all over the world. The 
number of people in developing countries living on less than 1 dollar a day 
has fallen from 28 % in 1987 to 24 % in 1998. However, in the develop-
ing world, largely due to population growth, from 1987-1998 the absolute 
number of people living on less than 1 dollar a day steadily rose (WDR, 
2000). Regional differences are great however. In terms of population share 
and absolute numbers, the number of poor people (under this definition) has, 
for example, fallen significantly in East Asia, while the opposite trend has 
been noted in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. It is estimated that today 
somewhere between 1.2 billion to 1.4 billion people live on less than 1 US$ a 
day (WDR, 2000; Feinstein and Picciotto (eds.), 2000; Chen and Ravallion, 
2000).
In the last decade NGOs and governments in developing and devel-
oped countries have continued their efforts to alleviate poverty, even with 
declining budgets in relation to overall population and economic growth.1 In 
many cases governments and NGOs have become more professional in their 
activities, for example working together at regional, national and interna-
tional level under different types of umbrella platforms and multilateral 
organisations. On the other hand, in many countries and regions fragmenta-
tion and scant outreach of poverty alleviation initiatives remain the rule.2 
Fortunately, sustained efforts by national and international NGOs and GOs 
towards poverty alleviation continuously trigger new thinking on all the 
possible variables that might constrain the development of the poor and the 
efficacy of development intervention.
A significant evolution can be noted with respect to the way poverty 
and poverty alleviation have been perceived over the past decade. Let us 
consider for example the authoritative World Development Report published 
1 “Despite having set ambi-
tious global targets for poverty 
reduction, donor countries are 
cutting back on aid and failing to 
focus what remains on poverty” 
(UNDP, 2000: 8).
2 In some cases, the more promi-
nent role of NGOs as a partial 
substitute for bilateral aid partly 
offsets the effect of increasing 
coordination efforts between the 
various development organisa-
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annually by the World Bank. In the World Development Report of 1990 a 
multi-dimensional conceptualisation of poverty was adopted. This concep-
tualisation, besides including the aspect of material deprivation, emphasised 
the low quality of human capital in terms of health and education. Hence, 
poverty alleviation was perceived as a two-tier strategy, promoting both 
labour-intensive growth and the provision of social services (WDR, 1990). 
Now, in the year 2000, after reading the most recent World Development 
Report on poverty one must conclude that the perspective has changed. The 
changed perspective reflects in many ways much of the work done in the 
academic world and other multinational agencies during the nineties (Max-
well, 2001). There are at least two important changes to be noted.
First of all, there is a departure from a relatively mechanical point 
of view towards a more people-oriented or micro point of view on pov-
erty alleviation. During the last decade it once more was emphasised that 
promoting economic growth is not the only difficulty; when growth has 
actually been achieved, it does not necessarily lead to advantages for all 
people. In addition, there are a number of factors that restrict the provision 
of social services to those that are most in need of them. In order to tackle 
these issues, increased importance was given to analyses of the development 
organisations and the poor people themselves in relation to macro-solutions 
on poverty alleviation.  In general there came to be an increased awareness 
of the fact that there are a number of structural barriers that exclude large 
groups from benefiting from economic growth (Chen and Ravallion, 2000). 
This brings us to the second important change, which refers to the 
fact that poverty is increasingly interpreted from a relational point of view 
(WDR, 2000). Poor people face a number of constraints that prevent them 
from participating in fruitful and meaningful ways in political, social and 
economic life. From this viewpoint, poverty is related to the nature of social 
networks and to the poor people’s place in these networks. This has led to 
more questions as to how these different kinds of networks function and 
how they evolve.
The World Development Report 2000/2001 is heavily inspired by 
what we will call in this paper an institutional or social capital perspective 
on poverty alleviation and development. The basic premise of an institution-
al perspective is the notion that everything people think, do and are able or 
allowed to do is influenced by institutions. Institutions are structures that are 
shaped by social interaction while in turn they constrain and give meaning 
to processes of social interaction. The institutional environment therefore 
is a crucial phenomenon, and in shaping the livelihood options of the poor, 
is increasingly recognised as such. Such an institutional perspective of the 
processes that constrain the livelihood opportunities of the poor is par-
ticularly helpful in explaining why many of the previous efforts at poverty 
alleviation have fallen short of their objectives. 4 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-06 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-06 • 5
Academic and policy-oriented research on institutions covers an 
impressive field of work. The first objective of this paper is to develop a 
workable, conceptual framework of what we perceive as the most important 
elements of the institutional debate concerning development and poverty 
alleviation. Our conceptual framework has primarily been inspired by a 
heterogeneous body of literature that is often referred to as New Institution-
alism. More specifically, we take as the basis of our work several theories 
from New Institutional Economics (e.g. Williamson (1985), North (1990)) 
and Social Capital Theory (e.g. Coleman (1988), Putnam (1993)), mostly in 
their guise of applied work in the field of development studies. Subsequently, 
these notions are connected to some concepts from the poverty debate, es-
pecially the issues of social exclusion and Sen’s entitlements and capabilities 
approach.
Our framework aims primarily at developing a coherent and well-de-
fined conceptual tool to analyse poverty, limiting ourselves to a pragmatic 
selection of the literature that is directly useful for our purpose. To a certain 
extent, we also try to review some of the variety in interpretations within in-
stitutional theories of development. First and foremost, this paper constitutes 
an exploration of how to link some basic issues of the poverty debate with 
different strands of the institutional theory of development. This endeavour 
is not without its problems, since many of the ideas and perspectives that we 
introduce are still relatively new and therefore continue to be the subject of 
intense debate. Further, we face the problem of multidisciplinary perspec-
tives on the subject. Over the years, many views concerning the relation-
ships between institutions and human strategic behaviour have become a 
common ground of debate for different disciplines within the social sciences. 
An advantage to this is that the institutional perspective on development 
offers some of the most fruitful inter-disciplinary opportunities for debate 
in the field of development studies. A disadvantage however is that this also 
engenders a variety of theoretical approaches that make it difficult to create 
conceptual and terminological clarity. In developing our conceptual frame-
work this is nevertheless exactly what we will be trying to accomplish.
The second objective of this paper is to link the institutional per-
spective with the theme of development intervention in the field of poverty 
alleviation and local development. One of the main tenets will be the hy-
pothesis that institutions, though complex in nature, are to be invested in 
to the benefit of the poor. In this sense, we are particularly interested in 
the potential intended and unintended effects of development interventions 
on the local institutional environment. The complexity of this issue again 
‘forces’ us to adopt a more exploratory rather than confirmatory tone in our 
line of reasoning. How to go about analysing the relationship between local 
development interventions and the institutional environment is a question for 
the short term. The conceptual framework, though not offering predefined 
methodological toolkits to this end, will offer an interesting lens through 
which to assess this relationship.6 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-06 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-06 • 7
2. Poverty and institutions: a first conceptual map
Poverty can be generally defined as pronounced deprivation in 
well-being (WDR, 2000: 15). Two aspects are inherent to the current un-
derstanding of poverty. The first is that poverty is a multi-dimensional and 
locally specific phenomenon. It includes such aspects as lack of income to 
obtain basic necessities (shelter, clothing, food, education), a sense of being 
both voiceless and powerless, and a state of vulnerability and incapacity to 
cope with disaster (WDR, 2000). This multi-dimensional concept gained 
ground during the nineties and, unlike narrow income-related or basic needs 
indicators of poverty, is difficult to capture in one indicator.
Such a multidimensional concept of poverty had already been devel-
oped by (amongst others) Nobel prize winner Amartya Sen. Until recently 
however, it would have been difficult to connect his work to the different 
debates on institutions and development. The recent debates on social capital 
and social exclusion (the latter finding some of its inspiration in the work 
of Sen) have made it possible to make a stronger conceptual link between 
a multidimensional concept of poverty and the workings of institutions and 
human agency (livelihood strategies). At the risk of some oversimplification, 
we will attempt to develop a conceptual framework that summarises and 
integrates the core ideas of these different concepts within the development 
debate.  
Amartya Sen’s approach to poverty is centred around the two key 
concepts of entitlements and capabilities. Sen’s work has provided insights 
into how to conceptualise poverty in a broad sense. Capabilities refer to 
what a person can actually do and be: “Ultimately, the process of economic 
development has to be concerned with what people can or cannot do, for 
example, whether they can live long, escape avoidable morbidity, be well 
nourished, be able to read and write, take part in literary and scientific pur-
suits, and so forth” (Sen, 1983: 754). They imply both a material aspect (e.g. 
access to goods for consumption, abilities to be economically active) as well 
as an intangible aspect (e.g. feeling sufficiently self-confident (Bebbington, 
1999), or what Adam Smith called the ability to appear in public without 
shame). Within this framework, poverty can be characterised as capabil-
ity deprivation (Sen 1999, 87-110). Such a definition incorporates issues of 
deprivation in multiple areas as well as the concern for distributive justice, 
although it clearly goes beyond that.
The second key contribution of Sen’s work is the concept of entitle-
ments, which refers to the claims people can make on the resources around 
them to build secure, satisfying and sustainable livelihoods. The claims on 
resources are determined both by a person’s position in society and by the 
rules of entitlement. The position a person occupies in society determines 
both his or her ownership of resources, the rules of exchange that apply to 
him or her in market transactions, and the access he or she has to several 6 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-06 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-06 • 7
types of institutions. In the work of Sen, the rules that determine people’s 
claims on resources are not consistently defined, entitlements often only re-
ferring to formal or legal rules of control or ownership (Gore, 1993). In this 
text, we will follow Gore’s example and define entitlements in the broadest 
possible sense, namely as “the set of alternative commodity bundles that a 
person can command in a society using the totality of rights and opportuni-
ties that he or she faces” (Sen, 1983: 754). Accordingly, the rules of entitle-
ment should be considered as being much wider in scope, and including the 
informal norms and values that govern people’s social interaction. Concomi-
tantly, the link between these rules and the “outcome” in terms of entitle-
ments is not fixed but subject to negotiation, confrontation and struggle 
(Gore, 1993: 447).  As we will demonstrate below, Sen’s work and Gore’s at-
tempt at a more comprehensive interpretation of the rules that shape people’s 
entitlements, bridge the gap between the poverty debate and a contemporary 
institutional perspective on development. Below, we will refer to the “rules 
of entitlement” as part of a society’s endowment in social capital. 
A lack of entitlements refers to a situation in which a person/
household cannot mobilise sufficient resources to secure his/her livelihood. 
Poor people lack sufficient assets and power and often face an environ-
ment which denies them sufficient access to and control over resources and 
services in order to build secure, satisfying and sustainable livelihoods.  In 
combination with other personal factors (old age, disease, low self-esteem,...) 
and allowing for variations in the physical environment, the lack of entitle-
ments makes them insufficiently ‘capable’ to construct secure and satisfying 
livelihoods.
Figure 1. Poverty, entitlements and capabilities: a first conceptual map
Figure 1 unites the different concepts and adds some more. People’s 
capabilities depend on a number of factors. Allowing for personal charac-
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ronment (climate, soils,...) capabilities are determined by people’s entitle-
ments or claims to resources and services, which in turn depend on both the 
processes governing resource allocation in a given society and their own 
choice of activities and social relationships -or livelihood strategies. The 
link between entitlements and the institutions which allocate resources is a 
complex one, depending as it does on a person’s social position as well as on 
the quality of social capital prevailing in the local institutional environment. 
We will discuss this link in a more detailed way in the following section 
(section 3). Further, we acknowledge that our use of the concept “livelihood 
strategies” differs to some extent from the way it has been used elsewhere 
(e.g. Bebbington, 1999; Ellis, 2000), in that this present work gives more 
weight to the active involvement of people in furthering and securing their 
economic well-being. However, for reasons which will become clear below, 
we do believe that the language of entitlements and institutions allows due 
emphasis to be given to the fact that livelihoods depend overwhelmingly 
on decision-levels and processes which can easily over-ride individuals’ at-
tempts to control them.
  
Finally, we added a link from capabilities back to entitlements and to 
the political arenas in which people can -to a varying degree- participate. In 
fact, every type of social interaction has a political ring to it. Each interac-
tion could be conceived as a bargaining process whereby people implicitly 
and explicitly negotiate the content of the relationship. This has conse-
quences for the terms of trade of exchange processes (exchange entitlements) 
and for participation in social structures -and access to the goods these 
structures allocate. However, people can also influence processes of resource 
allocation by participating, in one way or another, in a variety of political 
arenas. Their ‘bargaining power’ in these arenas will not only depend on 
their own capabilities but also on the way they are ‘represented’ by civic 
organisations and political leaders, and on the political rules of the game 
themselves. The concept of political arenas will be discussed further in sec-
tion 3.3. 
3. Institutions, entitlements and social capital
In this section, we develop the link upwards from entitlements 
to the institutions allocating resources. The first sub-sections introduce 
the main concepts. First, (3.1.) we define the concept of institutions and 
the different layers which can be discerned in each institution. Though the 
institutional environment does not only cover resource-allocating institu-
tions, they are certainly part of it. Then, we differentiate between several 
institutional forms of resource allocation, in function of the different types 
of commodities on which a person’s livelihood is built (3.2). In a next section 
we compound the picture presented thus far by discussing the reverse arrows 
of figure 1, denoting “political complexities” (Sen, 1983).  The concepts in-
troduced in the first three sections allow us, then, to discuss poverty both in 
terms of social exclusion (3.4) and in terms of lack of social capital (3.5.). 8 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-06 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-06 • 9
3.1.Institutions and institutional layers
In their daily struggle to secure their livelihoods individuals are 
faced with a high degree of uncertainty and risk. In addition, the uncertainty 
of their livelihoods is compounded by the complexity of the environment 
around them. Because of time constraints and practical reasons, the de facto 
availability of information about this complexity is by definition imperfect. 
At the same time, any human’s ability to decipher and make sense of the 
environment is inherently limited such  that the use of cultural heuristics 
(interpretative shorthand) is inevitable. Any individual therefore has to base 
decisions regarding action and behaviour upon imperfect subjective models 
about reality and its opportunities and constraints. In economics, the con-
cept of bounded rationality is traditionally used to refer to the behaviour of 
individuals who try to make the best rational decisions given these unavoid-
able constraints (Simon, 1985; North, 1990). In fact, the permanent calcula-
tive weighting of opportunities and constraints as well as the screening of all 
feasible alternatives in each particular choice situation is practically impos-
sible. People in most situations therefore live by established behavioural 
rules and practices that almost by their existence have historically proven to 
satisfy the needs of the situations to which they apply. Until these inherited 
institutions in a very clear sense no longer satisfy needs, people will stick to 
familiar rules and practices. This view can be considered as a more nuanced 
and realistic perspective on individual choice processes than the comprehen-
sive optimising behaviour assumed by the neo-classical economics para-
digm (Simon, 1985). 
Given that other human beings are almost by necessity part of an 
individual’s environment and therefore potentially an additional factor of 
unpredictability and complexity, it is logical to assume that this patterning 
and rule-making behaviour is a collective exercise: “if a person wants to 
make the world more predictable, then that person has to carve out events 
that have boundaries and that are repeated. The person has to segregate and 
stabilise some portion of the ongoing events. But in an interdependent world, 
crowded with people, it is difficult to produce the acts of closure alone” 
(Weick, 1979: 117-8). Hence, the role of institutions as the “humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction” (North, 1990: 3). Institutions are 
about creating meaning, providing guidance and reducing the uncertainty of 
human (inter)action in the sense that they represent collectively accepted or 
shared ways in which people interact and think about themselves, each other 
and the world around them. Institutions, in other words, play a determinant 
role as they form the basic interpretative and regulatory framework for hu-
man action.
Institutions cover a wide array of phenomena. Examples of institu-
tions are: common understandings (beliefs, norms) that facilitate co-opera-
tion; hierarchic bodies made up of, for example, judges, village chiefs or 
police officers who attempt to resolve disputes among people more ef-
ficiently; money as a standardised unit for exchange; the family as a core 10 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-06 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-06 • 11
arena for intense social interaction and mutual exchange; organisations such 
as banks and churches with standardised procedures for social interaction, 
etc. Institutions can be found at different levels of social interaction (group, 
community, region, etc.) with varying degrees of collective acceptance.
Institutions are dynamic in nature. Even though they are supposed 
to ‘fix’ behaviour in distinctive patterns, in fact they constantly evolve and 
are contested and adapted through social interaction processes, as we will 
explain later on in this paper. In this context, Uphoff (1993) talks about the 
process of ‘institutionalisation’. The ‘degree’ to which the previous examples 
can in fact be termed institutions depends on a number of factors such as the 
population of reference (i.e. a group versus a nation), and the level of collec-
tive acceptance and legitimacy within the population of reference.
It is useful to distinguish three layers in the institutional environment 
(see figure 2 below). At first level we observe regularised structures of social 
interaction in the form of social relationships, networks and organisations 
that constitute the social landscape. At second level we can identify the dif-
ferent sets of institutional rules that govern these structures of social inter-
action. Finally, we distinguish a third level, which maps culture, or the way 
in which individuals perceive their world, including others and themselves 
(their identities), and what they find valuable.3








Social structures refer to the composition of connections between 
people. The simplest connection is a relationship between two persons. 
Relationships are based on friendship, professional communication, kinship, 
and so on, or a combination of these elements (multi-stranded).  Aggregate 
forms of social structure can either be of an open and flexible nature, such as 
networks, or of a more closed and regulated nature as is the case with organ-
isations. Organisations include structures that are governed in a relatively 
informal way, households and families for example, and more formally ruled 
structures such as farmers’ associations, churches, enterprises, agencies, etc. 
All these forms of social structures are entities which partly overlap. At the 
same time individuals participate in different social structures (relationships, 
networks, organisations) at different levels.4
3 Our categorisation slightly 
differs from that of North, 
whose category of “informal 
rules” comprises the informally 
enforced rules applicable in 
determinate contexts as well as 
internally enforced codes of con-
duct, presupposing the existence 
of non-wealth maximising con-
siderations in individuals’ utility 
functions (North, 1990: 40).
 4 The study of social structures 
as such has been an important 
research agenda in economic so-
ciology (e.g. Granovetter, 1985; 
Burt, 1992).10 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-06 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-06 • 11
Depending on the type of social structure and the people who partici-
pate in it, different kinds of rules govern social interaction and more specifi-
cally the exchange processes of information and resources. Rules can be of 
a formal nature such as, for example, laws, regulations and procedures, or 
more informal, for example, norms and rules of conduct. The former type is 
explicitly written down, which implies that rule abidance can be monitored 
more easily and, probably, enforced more effectively, allowing for a regula-
tion of broader and more complex types of social structures such as big en-
terprises and states.  Informal rules (e.g. customary access rules to common 
property resources, the physical distance you must keep from others during 
a conversation, or the way people look each other in the eye5) are not coded 
and are sometimes very difficult to render explicit. This does not make 
them trivial, however, as their existence promotes the subtle social game of 
showing agreement with, or  defiance of the other party’s claim, by using the 
non-explicit character of the rule as a shield of ambiguity.         
Besides ‘structure’ and (informal and formal) ‘rules’ that govern so-
cial interaction we distinguished ‘culture’ as a third layer of the institutional 
environment. The third layer involves people’s perceptions and identities, 
or the way in which they perceive themselves and their environment, in the 
double sense of apprehension and (re)creation. People’s identity is among 
other things a function of how they see themselves compared to others. Thus 
there is also an implicit judgement on fairness and fair treatment behind the 
concept of identity. From the point of view of this third institutional layer 
and at the risk of some oversimplification, we may conceive of the social 
structure and its rules as reflecting the identity -values, attitudes, percep-
tions- of those who dominate the important public arenas in society.6 In 
other words, institutions do not only determine what people get, but they 
also assign social roles, reflecting who these people should be. In practice, 
there can be a contrast between socially assigned roles and cultural identi-
ties. Hence, the way social structures and rules function in practice depend 
inter alia on whether assigned roles are perceived as fair or unfair (given 
people’s self-perception).
To sum up, institutions are the collectively accepted or shared ways 
in which people interact and think. Virtually all social interaction in which 
people exchange resources, information, services and implement activities is 
embedded in institutions. More specifically, at all levels of social interaction, 
the way in which people are connected to each other and the way in which 
these interactions are governed and given meaning are determinant for the 
distribution of power and access to and control over resources and services.
3.2.Entitlements, types of goods and the institutional trinity
The set of alternative commodity bundles that persons can 
command in a society also depends on people’s agency. People’s livelihoods 
strategies can be characterised by a portfolio of activities and social relation-
5 See De Boeck (1999: 195), 
who draws attention to the 
exemplary male Luunda habit 
of looking others straight in the 
eye, whereas  women favour  the 
typical sideways look. 
6 This implies that subordinated 
groups can accept and even col-
laborate to enforce these rules for 
mere tactical reasons; institutions 
are in part sustained by what 
Margaret Levi calls ‘contingent 
consent’ (Levi, 1990: 407).12 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-06 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-06 • 13
ships in function of getting by and moving ahead. Poor people employ a va-
riety of strategies in order to survive, thereby continuously trying to reduce 
uncertainty (economic, climatic, etc.), to ease demands on their income and 
consumption and to cope with hidden eventualities. In order to fulfil these 
objectives, the poor engage in different income earning activities and social 
relationships that can be mobilised in different circumstances and under dif-
ferent conditions (see Chambers, 1997; Ellis, 1998). 
Such a portfolio concerns several levels and types of decision-making. 
It is difficult to analyse poverty and livelihood strategies without acknowl-
edging these different levels and types of interaction and decision-making. 
For operational purposes it is useful to distinguish between three sectors 
of social interaction. These sectors are commonly called the state or public 
sector, the market or private sector and the third sector, sometimes called the 
voluntary sector or collective action sector. It is through relationships with 
these three sectors that people gain access to and control over resources and 
services (see Bebbington, 1999). 
The performance of these three sectors is determined by different 
mechanisms or sets of rules which can be summarised as exit, voice and loy-
alty. The public sector is characterised by formal bureaucratic mechanisms 
that are governed by regulations and backed up by formal sanctions (state 
coercion). Examples of public sector players are the national governmental 
bodies such as parliament or the police as well as regional and local govern-
mental agencies such as the branch offices of ministries, municipal govern-
ments, village councils, etc. The quality of the public sector hinges crucially 
on the way in which citizens can use voice, or are able to participate in 
policy-making and criticise government performance. The private sector is 
characterised by market processes and decentralised individual decision-
making that is governed by financial incentives. The performance of market 
operators is held in check to the degree that customers can freely exit, or 
switch from one operator to another. Examples are multinational compa-
nies, regional companies and branch offices, village shops, etc. The collec-
tive action sector is characterised by voluntary association and cooperation 
governed by mutual agreements and backed by social pressure. Examples 
are national and regional cooperative societies, producers’ associations, local 
savings groups, etc.  People can withdraw freely, cooperation is voluntary. 
Thus, the performance of this sector depends on the feelings of loyalty such 
organisations are able to foster: it is loyalty alone which prompts people to 
voice their opinion when mere withdrawal would be the cheapest option.
Figure 3 presents a preliminary overview of the different kinds of 
local organisations belonging to each sphere of this institutional trinity.  
The following types of organisations can be discerned: local administration 
(public), local government (public), membership organisations (collective 
action), cooperatives (collective action), service organisations (private), 
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scriptive format for categorising local level organisations according to their 
institutional affiliation based upon their dominant governance principles. It 
can easily be extended to embrace a number of transactions and interactions 
that take place outside of stable, formal organisations. Consider for example 
the following interactions: a farmer selling a pig to a neighbour (market), a 
meeting of women on the topic of child care (collective action), a community 
leader doing one of his supporters a favour (hierarchy).7
Figure 3. Types of organisations by sector
Note: Please note that following Uphoff’s classification, professional (external) NGOs are classified as 
private sector (non-profit) organisations, and not as collective action organisations.
Source: Adapted from Uphoff (1993: 613).
An important advantage of this institutional trinity approach is that 
it enables us to reflect theoretically on the comparative governance ad-
vantages of the different institutional sectors. The relative importance and 
specific roles of the state, market and collective action sector in develop-
ment processes have been the centre of much discussion within the develop-
ment debate for decades. In Annex 1, we present a useful framework which 
can help solve the question as to which institutional players should best be 
made responsible for the provision of different types of goods and services. 
The framework builds on the classical economists’ argument assigning the 
allocation/provision of different types of goods (private, club, public and 
common pool goods) to different types of institutions (Bator, 1958). This ar-
gument is then given nuances in the sense that the optimal provision of each 
of these goods is arguably the result of a combination of state, market and 
civil society rather than of each of these institutions separately (Picciotto, 
1995). In the scheme in Annex 1, two additional categories of goods can be 















































7 Note that when talking about 
interactions taking place outside 
of organisations, it is more useful 
to use the term hierarchy (versus 
collective action and market 
logic) instead of state or public 
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identified. The first refers to the quality or performance of hierarchy while 
the second concerns the possibility of withdrawal within the market and 
civil society. Below, this framework is linked to the notion of social capital 
(3.5.) and referred to when project and policy interventions are considered 
(4.2.2.).
3.3.Political complexities
An institutional set-up is also a social construction in its own 
right. The decision as to whether or not a hungry, destitute person is entitled 
to food is, in this sense, the result of the political and social pressure he or 
she is able to exert (Sen, 1983: 757). Writing on political complexities in 
the eighties, Sen compared the advantages and disadvantages (in terms of 
capabilities) of India and its democracy and China under Mao. We believe 
that this early analysis is flawed in two ways. To begin with, it draws a 
boundary between resource-allocating institutions and political institutions. 
In practice, however, this is a difficult boundary to set up, the distinction 
between the two types of institutions being rather artificial. If we accept 
the hypothesis that the concept of “entitlements” should be interpreted in its 
broadest sense so as to give due weight to the numerous possibilities regard-
ing the people who contest, negotiate and re-interpret the rules of the game, 
their social position, and the way in which both are applied in a particular 
situation, then every institution has a political side and the social landscape 
can accordingly be described as a myriad of bargaining processes. Further, 
by comparing, say, authoritarian and democratic political systems, Sen does 
not do justice to the fact that the rules governing these political systems can 
themselves be contested, re-negotiated and re-interpreted. “Democracy” is 
itself not an exogenously determined yes-or-no variable, it is the result of a 
political game as well as a determinant of the way this game is played.  
Thus, the institutional landscape need not only be considered in terms 
of the capabilities it generates, it can also be considered as a set of politi-
cal arenas in which persons can participate. This they can do to varying 
degrees, of course, depending not only on their capabilities and preferences, 
but also on how this arena is institutionalised, i.e. how it is structured (who 
are the main “voices”?), ruled (what are the political rules of the game?), 
and how different players can be distinguished according to their identities, 
perceptions and the ensuing strategies they pursue.8 
Sometimes bargaining processes are very explicit, namely when the 
guiding principles that govern the relationship (rules, norms) can openly 
be contested by the parties involved. For example, in the case of a recently 
founded village association, struggles between members over meaning (i.e. 
the rules) as well as over power and voice are explicit. In other circumstanc-
es they mostly remain dormant, such as in the case of a relationship between 
mother and son or a long-lasting relationship between a tenant farmer and 
his landlord. In such cases ‘resistance’ may surface suddenly on particu-
8 On the concept of  political 
arena in terms of its (i) main 
participants, (ii) rules and (iii) 
strategies, see Bierschenk and 
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lar occasions or be expressed in subtle and indirect ways (Scott, 1990). In 
practice this implies that there are often significant differences between the 
public and the hidden transcript (Scott, 1990). Whereas the former refers to 
the official discourse, strategies and ways people have of dealing with each 
other in a certain social context (e.g. a local government agency), the hidden 
transcript refers to the underlying strategies and rules of the game that dif-
ferent individuals (who also interact outside this particular social structure) 
follow in their dealings with each other.
It may also be relevant to distinguish between types of political arenas 
in terms of the level of formality they have attained. In the context of formal 
organisations bargaining spaces are often more tightly restricted within the 
institutional framework (structure and rules) of the organisation. Certainly, 
there are also informal (cultural) rules, which might imply that formal rules 
are not implemented in accordance with their definition. In simpler and less 
formal social interaction, bargaining spaces are often larger due to the fact 
that a formal structure is lacking, and therefore both meaning and outcome 
are less explicit and hence to a larger extent subject to negotiation. For 
example, two neighbouring farmers who share similar norms of reciprocity 
over land grazing rights might not abide by these norms if one or both see 
certain (economic) gains in breaking them. Let us suppose that the custom-
ary norm is that neighbouring farmers should help each other when quality 
pasture becomes scarce. The legitimacy or exact meaning of the norm might 
be contested or renegotiated. For example, instead of letting the cattle of 
one farmer simply graze on the other’s land and vice versa, more detailed 
arrangements could be negotiated with respect to the period of grazing and 
number of cattle allowed on each farmer’s property. Moreover, what happens 
in “informal” political arenas is per definition not written down. As a result, 
the “rules of the game” do not so much depend on the historical track record 
of decision-making as on the way in which this historical track record is re-
membered. In such a setting, “the production (and circulation) of knowledge 
in this context is competitive -but not perfectly so. Some witnesses carry 
more weight than others, owing to differences in social position or reputa-
tion; some give more convincing accounts. People may also influence the 
course of negotiations by limiting access to historical knowledge” (Berry, 
1997: 1236). Sara Berry notes for instance that conflicts over land can at 
least in part be traced back to conflicts over history. Concomitantly, “in most 
cases... individuals’ claims stand or fall with the recollections, and reputa-
tions, of their witnesses. In practice, land rights are subject to intermittent 
or on-going negotiation, land tenure security depends more on a person’s 
standing with his/her relatives and neighbours than on the way in which a 
claim was originally acquired” (1997: 1232). 
Further, it should be mentioned at this point that the institutional land-
scape to be found in many countries can usefully be described as polycepha-
lous or pluriform, involving, as it does, different public arenas, being the 
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of meaning, rules and key players (Bierschenk et al. 2000: 10).  The concept 
of a polycephalous society was introduced by Bierschenk and others in order 
to emphasise the relatively chaotic character of (African) society.  In this 
respect, they take issue with the perspectives of e.g. Hyden (1983), Médard 
(1991) and Schatzberg (1991) at macro-level, or Abraham and Platteau (2001) 
at micro-level, who try to make sense of African politics in terms of an 
underlying but largely invisible “logic” behind a “modern” façade. The idea 
of a polycephalous society is also reminiscent of Migdal’s argument that in 
many third world countries, it is futile to look for a central core, “where the 
ballgame is being played”, since 
“in many third world countries, many ballgames may be played 
simultaneously. In weblike societies, although social control is fragmented 
and heterogeneous, this does not mean that people are not being governed; 
they most certainly are. The allocation of values, however, is not central-
ized. Numerous systems of justice operate simultaneously”
(Migdal, 1988: 39). 
It is true that Bierschenk et al. restrict their analysis to “African       
society”, whereas Migdal restricts it to “many third world societies”. Neither 
of them justifies the implication that non-African or non-third world coun-
tries are not pluriform. We assume that, if such a difference does indeed 
exist, it must be a matter of degree rather than kind.9 Whatever the case, the 
point is that a society’s social landscape can usefully be described as a set 
of different political arenas which, because of the different ways in which 
they are structured, ruled and given meaning, create much political ambi-
guity and room for manoeuvre. The hybrid character of the institutional 
framework cannot be expected to be a temporary or transitory phenomenon, 
as it will also be reproduced and deepened by individual players who, in an 
attempt to secure their ownership rights to goods and resources, will not risk 
putting all their eggs in one political basket (Berry, 1997: 1237).
3.4. Poverty and social exclusion
There is a narrow link between a lack of entitlements to re-
sources and the concept of social exclusion. Social exclusion has been devel-
oped mainly within the European poverty debate, where it has been taken 
up by different schools of thought.10 Kaijage and Tibaijuka (1996: 5), two of 
the better-known authors making use of the concept in a developing coun-
try context, emphasise that “[t]he value of the concept lies in the fact that it 
seeks to unite the different elements of social disadvantage... by establishing 
interrelationships between them in the context of their organic linkage to the 
structure and functioning of society as a whole”. Kaijage and Tibaijuka thus 
emphasise the analytical force of the concept.11 
They draw on the traditional view, amongst others, which sees exclu-
sion as the outcome of what Max Weber called a process of social closure, or 
9 See for example the debate on 
the articulation between migrant 
identities and the “developed” 
states that host them (Vranken 
and Timmerman, 2000).
10 For a background discussion on 
social exclusion see for example 
Rodgers et al. (1995), Silver  
(1995).
11 See also Gore (1995), who dis-
tinguished between normative, 
descriptive and analytical uses of 
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“a process of subordination whereby one group monopolises advantages by 
closing off opportunities to outsiders whom it defines as inferior or ineli-
gible” (Silver, 1995: 69). This description underlines two basic aspects of 
social exclusion, more systematically addressed by Vranken et al. (1997), 
namely that social exclusion implies an element of subordination and of 
social divisiveness.
Social exclusion is characterised by social barriers that restrict social 
interaction and entitlements to different types of resources and services. 
These barriers may result from differences in age, gender, wealth, education 
level, kinship, ethnicity, profession, geographic location, religion or political 
affiliation. These are characteristics which cut across barriers. All these ele-
ments may be a source of either discrimination or disadvantage. In terms of 
the institutional layers identified above under 3.1. we can define social exclu-
sion as the application of a different set of rules to different identities. 
It is obvious that when an individual is placed in several underprivi-
leged categories at the same time, the probability of facing deprivation 
(being poor) is higher, such as in the case of, say, a homeless woman from 
an ethnic minority in a rural isolated village. It may also be, of course, that 
investment in some identity will exclude an individual from certain goods 
but will, on the other hand, guarantee access to others. 
 
Elaborating on this point of view, poverty, which refers to a certain 
(relative or absolute) level of multidimensional deprivation, is not the same 
as social exclusion. It can be perceived as the outcome of a dynamic process 
of multiple social exclusion or the inability of being able to participate in a 
meaningful and fruitful way in different social arenas, necessary to con-
struct a secure and satisfying life. Social exclusion separates the excluded 
from generally accepted patterns of life in society. The poor, who face 
multiple exclusion, cannot bridge these gaps by themselves (Vranken et al., 
1997: 314). All of this suggests that poverty is first and foremost a social and 
institutional problem, not (only) an individual problem of the poor. In other 
words, fighting poverty inevitably implies social and institutional change.
The concept of social exclusion should, however, also be viewed in the 
light of the findings of the previous subsection. It should, indeed, be noted 
that “if access and exploitation hinge on social identities and social identities 
are based on multiple, overlapping criteria, then it follows that conditions of 
access to productive resources and mechanisms of labour exploitation are 
partly matters of definition” (Berry, 1988: 65). Concomitantly, social exclu-
sion partly refers to the inability to participate in the interpretation or redefi-
nition of rules and social classifications -in the political arenas. And hence 
fighting poverty implies, in the first instance, allowing people to participate 
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3.5.Social capital: a positive sum game perspective 
The idea of social exclusion, in the sense of social inequality 
and divisiveness sustaining unequal entitlements, suggests a zero sum game. 
The richer, more powerful, better connected individuals and groups live 
their lives at the cost of the poor and excluded. A more equal distribution 
of access to resources, services, information and power would improve the 
capabilities of the poor. However, the distribution issue, though undeniably 
important, is only part of the picture. Recent theories on the externalities of 
social interaction, centred around the concept of social capital, refer to the 
positive sum game of improved social interaction between individuals and 
groups at all levels. 
The basic idea of social capital is that the (institutionally embedded) 
processes of social interaction within a society generate externalities that 
affect the development prospects of society as a whole. Over the last dec-
ade and especially following the publication of Robert Putnam’s seminal 
work of social capital in northern and southern Italy (1993), social capital 
has become an increasingly broad and popular field both at academic and 
policy level involving a range of disciplines and covering various fields of 
study. Nevertheless, despite its popularity (or possibly because of it) much 
conceptual and terminological confusion still surrounds the concept.12 Even 
in the field of development studies, contrasting interpretations of the con-
cept continue to exist (Dasgupta and Serageldin, 2000).13 There is a broad 
consensus that social capital is about the nature of social structures, the rules 
that govern them and the belief structures of the people who enact them, as 
well as about the developmental effects generated by constellations of social 
structure, rules and culture at different levels of social interaction (indi-
vidual, group, community, society). Since the idea of a positive sum game of 
social interaction between different individuals (households and groups) is 
both attractive and very relevant for development intervention and poverty 
alleviation, in this section we will explore some of the relatively widely ac-
cepted viewpoints within the social capital debate.
The most popular definition of the concept of social capital is per-
haps that originally given by Putnam (1993) and which refers to a society’s 
endowments of voluntary networks, norms of reciprocity and trust. In his 
comparative study between northern and southern Italy he found that the 
developmental performance of the north was significantly related to the fact 
that it had a higher endowment of these three elements of social capital. 
Several other authors have confirmed the developmental effect of 
social capital as an independent ‘factor in the development equation’.14 When 
reading social capital literature within the field of development studies 
several mechanisms or externalities which affect prospects for local develop-
ment can be distinguished:
12 In fact, much of the heated 
debate on social capital has 
been concerned with conceptual 
discussions which, as one author 
succinctly poses, have produced 
more ‘heat than light’ (Edwards, 
1999).
13 Examples of important con-
tributions on social capital in 
general and more particularly in 
the field of development studies 
are as follows: Coleman (1990), 
Putnam (1993), Woolcock (1998), 
Woolcock and Narayan (2000), 
Dasgupta and Serageldin (2000).
14 See for example Narayan and 
Pritchett (1997), Knack and 
Keefer (1997), Grootaert (1999), 
Krishna and Uphoff (1999), 
Uphoff and Wijayaratna (2000), 
Maluccio et al. (1999), Grootaert 
et al. (2000), Grootaert and 
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1. Better information flows. There are several beneficial effects to bet-
ter information flow. For example, a swifter diffusion of innovations coming 
from outside. In addition, a better information flow lowers the barriers that 
hinder interaction between persons, thus promoting social and economic 
exchange.
2. More effective and cheaper contract enforcement. Repeated 
interactions between community members can lead to the development of 
reputation mechanisms, thus reducing opportunism and creating security. 
Moreover, the increased possibilities which social pressure produces can 
reduce opportunistic behaviour.
3. A greater capacity for local collective action. Collective action at 
community level is important for the production and maintenance of local 
public goods (e.g. wells, roads) as well as for the management of common 
property resources (e.g. local irrigation schemes, fishing resources, forests).
4. Better prospects for the development of informal mutual insurance 
mechanisms. If networks are more open and the same norms and percep-
tions are shared, so the prospects for mutual support between households 
increase.
5. Better synergy between different organisations of the state, market 
and collective action sector. An effective and open relationship between the 
state (or other external organisations) and local communities is most easily 
established when social structures are less segmented and more egalitarian. 
This allows for easier and more inclusive organisational processes at com-
munity level and thus facilitates cooperation with external organisations.15
Different interpretations in the social capital debate can usefully be 
grouped in the following categories, which to a certain degree represent an 
evolution in the debate (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000; see also Serageldin 
and Grootaert, 2000; WDR, 2000):
Communitarian view
Within this view social capital is defined in the light of the quality and 
quantity of local associations (clubs, civic groups). More specifically, those 
advocating this point of view look at the number and density of local asso-
ciations. More associations mean more social capital. The downside of social 
capital, however, is ignored. Dense networks can also put strain on develop-
ment prospects. For example, the pressure to distribute gains from economic 
activity can reduce personal incentives to improve business opportunities. 
Another example refers to the situation whereby dense (but otherwise rela-
tively isolated) networks may develop norms and rules that do not coincide 
with the collective good (i.e. criminal gangs).
Networks view
This view focuses on both the positive and negative sides of social 
networks. It is recognised that strong inter-group ties16 play important roles 
in giving meaning to people’s lives and serve as the principal mechanisms 
of social support. In addition, however, weak inter-group ties that breach 
15 A more systematic attempt 
to categorise the ways in which 
social interaction affects de-
velopment prospects has been 
developed by Collier (1998). 
(Different kinds of) social 
interaction facilitate information 
flows between people which play 
an important role in generating 
the following three externalities:
1. Learning about each other. 
More open social interaction 
with improved information flows 
permits individuals to learn more 
about other people. This reduces 
the uncertainty of dealing with 
other persons. Hence, interac-
tion and transactions could be 
facilitated, enabling reputations 
and trust to be more easily estab-
lished between individuals.
2. Learning about the world. 
Information flows carry knowl-
edge and innovations which 
constitute an important resource 
for development.
3. Achieving collective action. 
This externality in principle de-
pends on the other two. Learning 
and communicating with other 
persons also stimulates the de-
velopment of shared visions and 
shared cultural identities. These 
greatly enhance the prospects for 
voluntary organisation between 
people.
16 The term ‘group’ here refers to 
the household, group and com-
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family, religious, ethnic and community (etc.) borders are very important in 
connecting people into wider networks regarding exchange of information, 
resources and services. Moreover, without these extra-group ties, the strong 
inter-group ties can become too suffocating in the sense described in the 
previous paragraph.
Institutional view17
The institutional view represents a collection of theoretical and em-
pirical work that originally did not form part of the social capital debate but 
which, as the debate evolved, came to be recognised increasingly as part of 
a social capital perspective and therefore was incorporated into more recent 
debates (see fourth perspective). This view stresses the role of the politi-
cal and legal environment as an important facilitator of local organisational 
processes. It also stresses that the performance of formal institutions such 
as states and private organisations (enterprises, NGOs) depends on their 
integrity, internal coherence, credibility and competence, as well as on their 
external accountability to civil society. 
Synergy view
This view can be seen as a synthesis of the strengths of on the one 
hand the networks perspective, largely micro or bottom-up, and on the other 
hand the institutional view, a mainly meso/macro or top-down perspective.  
The synergy view discerns three types of social capital. The first two refer 
to the importance of the strong inter-group ties and weak extra-group ties 
already mentioned under the networks perspective. These are respectively 
referred to as bonding and bridging social capital. A third group of ties, so 
called linking social capital, incorporates the institutional view on social 
capital, e.g. the way in which citizens are linked to the state. The main argu-
ment is that development outcomes depend not only on the quality of each 
type of social capital but also on the way in which bonding, bridging and 
linking social capital are combined and play a complementary role. Wool-
cock for instance suggests that the challenge for policy-makers is “to trans-
form situations where a community’s social capital substitutes for weak, 
hostile or indifferent formal institutions into ones in which both realms com-
plement one another” (2000: 238). This complementarity had already been 
appropriately phrased eight years before by Uphoff who pointed out that: 
“paradoxical though it may seem, ‘top-down’ efforts are usually 
needed to introduce, sustain and institutionalise ‘bottom-up’ development. 
We are commonly constrained to think in ‘either-or’ terms - the more of one 
the less of the other - when both are needed in a positive-sum way to achieve 
our purposes” (1992: 73).
We see three particular ways in which the literature on social capital, 
and especially the synergy view, can be connected to the debate on poverty.
17 Not to be confused with what 
we call an institutional perspec-
tive in this paper, which is much 
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To begin with, in the recent World Development Report 2000/2001 
the three dimensions of social capital were linked to the social exclusion 
perspective on poverty. The vision elaborated in the report supports the con-
clusion that each individual, household, group, community, or society should 
be endowed with an appropriate mix of bonding, bridging and linking ties 
to be able to get by and get ahead. In the case of poor individuals or house-
holds, the worst case of social exclusion occurs when the poor lack intensive 
reciprocal ties with family and neighbours (bonding), are not well integrated 
into wider processes of social, political and economic interaction with other 
groups in the community (bridging), and are not acceptably connected to 
important persons in the three institutional realms outside the local commu-
nity (linking).
Such an individual perspective on social capital clearly does not how-
ever exhaust its meaning and importance as regards an anti-poverty policy. 
In fact, it does not as such add to the definition of poverty we have already 
developed in the previous section. Instead, we would rather make use of 
the concept to refer to the quality of the institutional set-up more generally. 
Accordingly, in terms of the discussion on the “institutional trinity” (section 
3.2.), social capital refers to (i) the quality and performance of the market, 
the state and the collective action sector as well as to (ii) the articulation 
between each of these institutional spheres. For example, every market 
transaction takes place in a specific local context, where appropriate norms 
and shared understandings in combination with a legitimate framework of 
legal rules help reduce the uncertainty and the risk of opportunism involved 
in market transactions. Another example would be a situation whereby the 
successful implementation of an irrigation system depends on the specific 
way in which different stakeholders from the state, market and collective ac-
tion sector are articulated; e.g. a voluntary association managing at low cost 
a local irrigation network built at low cost by a private enterprise, financed 
by a private service enterprise (i.e. an external NGO) and identified at low 
cost by the state. In the Annex, we present a useful framework which can 
facilitate this kind of comparative institutional efficiency analysis. 
Finally, in terms of the discussion regarding the polycephalous char-
acter of the institutional landscape (section 3.3.), it is valuable to focus on the 
dimension of linking social capital. If we consider the interaction with local 
populations (linking social capital), development interventions are inevitably 
embedded in different structures each with their own rules and culture. For 
example, local government employees very often originate from the locality 
they work in and are therefore, inevitably, very much influenced by hid-
den preferences in their dealings with the local population.  They are also 
susceptible to favouritism, or may be under pressure from kinship issues or 
other ties with the local population. To counterbalance this, some level of 
independence and organisational integrity is needed in order to maintain the 
comparative advantage in the development process of the external organi-
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services and goods for both vulnerable (and often excluded) and better off 
local groups alike, serving as independent facilitators in building dialogues 
between local groups, etc.). One could go further by presuming that supra-
local players who lack some level of internal coherence and independence 
to establish accountable and inclusive relationships with individuals at the 
community level may have perverse effects on local development prospects 
by (unconsciously) strengthening processes of social exclusion and destroy-
ing bonding and bridging ties. In the reverse case, independent and ethically 
sound development organisations may also lack the necessary local embed-
dedness to achieve the right level of synergy with local institutions. Thus, 
poverty interventions need to find the right balance between (or the most 
appropriate way out of the dilemma between) embeddedness and integrity. 
This is the basic reason as to why Woolcock argues for a social institutional 
analysis: 
“Understanding how outside agencies can work to alleviate poverty 
in diverse and poorly understood communities remains one of the great 
challenges of development. A social capital perspective stresses that tech-
nical and financial soundness is a necessary but insufficient condition for 
acceptance of a project by poor communities... Understanding how pro-
posed policy interventions will affect the power and political interests of the 
stakeholders is a vital consideration, since all policy interventions occur in 
a social context characterized by a delicate mix of informal organizations, 
networks, and institutions” (2000: 242). 
4.Poverty alleviation and development intervention:
promoting institutional change
4.1.Conceptualising institutional change
The term ‘institutional change’ refers to a very complex process 
not in the least because of the diversity in institutions and the local specifi-
city of the institutional environment. The comprehensiveness of the concept 
of institutions in particular warrants caution in any discussion concerning 
institutional change. It is beyond the scope of this paper to give a full over-
view of the debate on institutional change processes.
Our discussion of institutional change owes much to New Institutional 
Economics (NIE). The basic premise of NIE is that changes in institutions 
can be explained by (aggregate) processes of individual behaviour. Using 
some basic elements from NIE, a fairly satisfying framework for the inter-
pretation of local institutional dynamics can be constructed by observing/
considering individual strategic behaviour and engagement in processes of 
social interaction. 
In the previous section, we emphasised the fact that every institution 
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landscape can therefore usefully be seen as a myriad of bargaining process-
es. This view is consistent with earlier publications by several (new institu-
tional) economists who have stressed the role of secular changes in resource 
endowments, demographic structure, technologies and preferences as the 
driving forces of institutional change processes (e.g. North, 1990; Hodgson, 
1993). Whatever the nature of the changes, they are reflected in variations in 
relative prices which alter the incentive structure for people, who can hence 
become motivated to change rules and social structures. As stated by North, 
“[w]e can begin by recognising that a basic source of institutional change 
is fundamental and persistent changes in relative prices, which lead one or 
both parties to contracts to perceive they could be better off by alterations in 
the contract” (1986: 234). For example, in some contexts, increased popula-
tion pressure and technological development have changed both the relative 
availability and the economic proceeds of the land and have thereby induced 
the development of private property rights (Platteau, 2000).
One of the early views within NIE poses that institutions, in their 
function of providing security and guidance with regard to people’s behav-
iour, are efficient in the sense that they minimise transaction costs for inter-
action and exchange processes given people’s preferences and resource and 
technology constraints (e.g. Williamson, 1985; North, 1990; Platteau, 2000). 
Consider the classical example of a sharecropping contract between landlord 
and tenant. The existence of the share contract is partially explained by its 
capacity to balance the need for adequate incentives for the tenant-labour-
ers and the management of risks for both parties to the contract. Due to the 
absence of insurance markets in the countryside, both the tenant and the 
landlord choose to share (part of) the costs and the output as a means to 
mitigate the risks of crop and price variability. The first alternative, a full 
tenancy contract, creates optimal incentives for the tenant, but also means 
full risk exposure. The other alternative, a wage employment contract, 
implies low incentives for the tenant (and thus high monitoring costs for the 
landlord), no exposure to risk for the tenant and thus full exposure for the 
landlord. In many instances, the share contract can be viewed as providing a 
compromise in terms of incentives and risk sharing. The share contract then 
represents an efficient inter-linked contract, involving joint transactions in 
land, labour and often also capital, with both risk management and transac-
tion cost advantages to the landlord (especially monitoring and enforcement 
costs) and the tenant (information costs, risk management) (Akerlof, 1976; 
Stiglitz, 1989; Hayami and Otsuka, 1993). 
Thus, given a competitive environment in which several institutional 
forms are pitted against each other, it may be assumed that the most efficient 
institution will drive out the less efficient ones. According to this early, nar-
row interpretation of institutional change, changes in preferences, resource 
endowments and technologies will inevitably lead to changes in the institu-
tional environment and hence to a new efficient equilibrium.24 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-06 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-06 • 25
However, although efficiency in terms of minimising transaction costs 
is a powerful motor for institutional change processes, it offers only a very 
partial explanation for institutional change. In reality many ‘dysfunctional’ 
or inefficient institutions continue to exist -or are difficult to weed out. The 
basic principle behind the continued existence of these ‘inefficient’ institu-
tions is path dependency (e.g. North, 1990; Putnam, 1993; Bardhan, 2000).  
It seems as though a given society is ‘trapped’ into its historically inherited 
structures, rules and culture, or at least that some avenues of institutional 
change are precluded due to the almost prohibitive transition cost. 
Path dependency is a far-ranging phenomenon that can be explained 
by several factors. Bardhan (2000) identifies two principal factors that 
underlie path-dependent processes. The first refers to the increasing returns 
from adopting a particular institutional arrangement. The more a certain 
pattern of interaction is applied or adopted, the more convenient for others 
it will become to follow the established pattern. As Bardhan asserts, “a path 
chosen by some initial adopters to suit their interests may ‘lock in’ the whole 
system for a long time to come, denying later, maybe potentially more ap-
propriate, institutions a footing” (ibid.: 223). Implicitly, Bardhan was already 
referring to the role of unequal (bargaining) power to which he returned 
later in the same paper. The second factor concerns the particular influence 
of historically inherited mental models (see also North, 1990). In general, 
established norms and values have a strong influence on what is to come, 
especially when considering that the insecurity stemming from imperfect in-
formation flows and the capacity to process such information makes people 
reluctant to pursue radical alternatives to generally established patterns of 
interaction: “Individuals often cannot even conceive of appropriate alterna-
tives (or [...] they regard as unrealistic the alternatives they can imagine). 
[...] In other words, some of the most important sunk costs are cognitive” 
(Dimaggio and Powell, 1991: 11).
Although path dependency is an important explanatory principle of 
institutional change, it should not be confused with the idea that societies 
can be trapped into either a high- or low-equilibrium path as though this 
were a matter of eternal bliss or doom. Although various influential social 
scientists stress the importance of historically embedded processes of insti-
tutional change (North, 1990; Putnam, 1993; Williamson, 1998), assuming 
institutional gradualism to the point of inertia would be erroneous. Most 
authors also propose an alternative, although mostly complementary, ex-
planation to path dependent processes of institutional change in the form of 
the idea of ‘system shock’ or ‘big bang’. Fundamental institutional changes 
over short periods of time are likely to occur in times of unplanned disaster, 
when the ‘normal’ ways of doing things seem clearly insufficient to resolve 
the urgent challenges ahead and when an active search begins for new mod-
els and rules.18
18 See for example the interest-
ing literature on the connection 
between World War II and the 
development of the European 
Social Security System, e.g. De 
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In practice, there are also examples of profound institutional changes 
that were consciously introduced under ‘normal’ circumstances but had 
profound effects on the institutional environment as a whole (e.g. changes in 
national constitutions; see for example Nugent, 2000). However, conscious 
efforts to bring about institutional change are heavily restricted by a lack of 
collective action. Bardhan (2000: 224) discerns two kinds of collective ac-
tion problems. The first concerns the bargaining problem and the influence 
of vested interests. The second problem refers to the public good aspect of 
institutional change and the associated free-rider problem.
The bargaining problem is essentially about disputes over the benefits 
of institutional change. Part of this problem concerns the lack of a shared 
social vision or consensus with regard to an alternative institutional struc-
ture. It may be that such a consensus is non-existent and that different social 
factions have conflicting claims on the possible benefits of institutional 
change.19 At this point, it is useful to reconnect to the above-mentioned con-
cepts of culture and identity. As was pointed out earlier, people will judge, 
and act within the framework of institutions in terms of the social identity 
they are granted, either explicitly or implicitly. Depending on whether 
people consider the state of affairs to be fair or unfair, their social identity 
can be mobilised for or against institutional change. Thus, given a certain 
historically inherited institutional context, fairness considerations do play 
a significant role in the (implicit or explicit) politics of institutional change 
(see also Platteau, 1994; 2000; see also De Herdt, 2002).
Another important aspect of the bargaining problem is the influence 
of powerful groups that have an interest in maintaining the institutional 
status quo, which is disadvantageous to the interests of the majority. NIE 
has emphasised the problem that institutions (e.g. the state, community 
organisations, rules for local resource management) can be taken over by an 
elite minority which is not interested in -or stands to lose from- institutional 
change. Thus institutional change is held back by unequal bargaining power 
to change the situation. Conversely, path dependent incremental change that 
reinforces the position of those in power can be broken by democratising 
institutions, by making them more transparent and accountable to the ‘will 
of all’ (e.g. Bates, 1996; North and Weingast, 1994).20
The second kind of collective action problem refers to the fact that 
institutional change is largely a public good, which implies that there is a 
potential problem of under-investment in processes of change. Just like other 
public goods, institutional change may be impeded by the free-rider prob-
lem. Institutional change may not materialise since the people who would 
like to ‘invest’ in change and pay the concomitant costs cannot exclude those 
who do not wish to pay, from benefiting from the investment. Changing 
institutions is not a cost-free process but requires time and effort. To begin 
with, there is the issue of initial set-up costs. In addition, there are learn-
ing, co-ordination and adaptation effects: people will have to learn how to 
19 What Bardhan termed ‘dis-
tributive conflicts’ arising in the 
absence of what Olson called 
‘encompassing interest groups’  
(Bardhan, 2000: 227-32).
20 In recent publications, po-
litical decentralisation has been 
advanced as one of the possible 
ways to democratise society. 
This might be  wrong, however, 
as there are indications that the 
local state seems to be more 
vulnerable to (local) elite inter-
ests than its central counterpart 
(Bardhan, 2000: 229; Bierschenk 
and Olivier de Sardan, 1998, 
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change their practices in the new environment and other institutional rules 
will probably be affected as well (North, 1990: 95). These costs are sunk 
costs; they are specific to the process of institutional change. Uncertainty 
about the results of institutional change may cause people to stick to patterns 
of interaction they dislike but which, as individuals, they are not willing or 
able to disrupt.
Since individuals do not have an incentive to uphold or change certain 
institutions given the fact that they cannot claim the (exclusive) benefits, 
there should be some kind of mechanism that permits these investments to 
be made. In theory (see figure 3), the state would be one of the appropriate 
actors to uphold and change institutions since it is a kind of institutionalised 
structure for collective action that works in the general interest of society 
(Hoff et al., 1993). Unfortunately, the situation of real-world states in devel-
oping countries, which are plagued by numerous problems and constraints, 
is such that public goods such as beneficial institutional change processes 
are inadequately or not at all provided by the state. In addition, many local 
institutions (though interacting with formal structures and rules) are less re-
spondent to state action, or in any case seem to evolve in rather autonomous 
ways (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan, 1998). Consequently, in many 
cases local collective action or joint efforts of both state and local collective 
action actors are essential to bring about institutional change processes (see 
section 2).
In general, we assert that given the high costs of transition from one 
path to another, the influence of historically inherited mental models, and 
the collective action problems to mobilise institutional change, institutional 
change is essentially ‘incremental’ and occurs ‘at the margin’. In practice, 
unintended and intended system shocks do occur. The impact of such shocks 
is highly variable not in the least because of the diversity in types of insti-
tutions and the interaction between them.21 In practice, the ‘institutional 
environment’ is ‘patchy’ and can be of a contradictory nature. However, 
given its local variability, and given the room for interpretation when trying 
to apply rules to real-life cases, we see no particular contradiction between a 
slowly evolving ‘tradition’ on the one hand and the sometimes rapidly evolv-
ing ways in which tradition is re-interpreted and re-constructed on the other 
(Bayart, 1994; Berry, 1997). We would interpret path dependency first and 
foremost as a warning that institutional change cannot but be framed within 
a society’s own terms. Institutional entrepreneurs (inter alia, development 
interventions) attempting to shape institutional change should realise this. 
Moreover, their actions are inevitably constrained by their specific articula-
tion with the institutional environment.
21 North (1990) among others 
illustrates the complexity of the 
interaction between informal 
and formal rules and rules and 
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4.2. The role of local development interventions in promoting 
institutional change
The purpose of this section is to reflect upon the possibilities 
to induce or facilitate the process of local institutional innovation from the 
‘outside’. The basic questions are: How do local development interventions 
directly and indirectly change the ways people interact and think about 
themselves and each other? And how can these changes lead to a more equal 
distribution of entitlements and/or result in economies of scale in terms of 
increased co-operation and other positive externalities for development?
We will argue that many of the most effective strategies for alleviating 
poverty in the long run concern institutional changes that involve both the 
poor and non-poor and in principle favour both groups. This assumption is 
based on a social capital or positive sum game viewpoint, as was illustrated 
above. Nevertheless, the circumstances in which strategies that involve 
positive sum game effects have to be devised are often far from simple and 
sometimes part of the game requires ‘simply’ working at a redistribution of 
entitlements, which implies a kind of zero sum game perspective of inter-
vention in favour of the poor.
Whatever the nature of any development intervention, it always 
influences local institutions. Given the complexity of  institutional change 
processes, the scope, sustainability and direction of the local institutional 
changes it ‘produces’ is, however,  often uncertain.22 Proponents of the 
synergy view to social capital are generally optimistic with respect to the 
prospects regarding the contributions of development interventions to local 
social capital/institution building. Other authors are more sceptical about the 
role of external actors mainly because of the reasons set out in the previous 
section.
It is important to re-emphasise the importance of path dependency, 
which implies, inter alia, that something like an ‘external’ intervention is 
in part an illusion, and a dangerous one.  ‘External actors’ will for example 
most likely be seen in terms of predecessors similar to them, even though 
in the external actors’ eyes the similarity may be too remote to be noticed. 
Most development interventions are not aware of these processes, and this 
might eventually constrain bringing about the intended impact of the inter-
vention. In addition, the ‘impact’ of a development intervention on the local 
institutional environment depends on the nature of the latter, which can vary 
substantially from place to place.23 For example, if the level of social divi-
siveness is high it is more difficult to promote collective action. Similarly, if 
cultural identities and informal rules are more receptive to co-operation and 
solidarity, stimulating collective action becomes less difficult.
From the point of view of the development intervention there are 
essentially three (groups of) factors that determine its effect on local institu-
tional change. First of all, the precise articulation between the intervention 
22 The indirect negative effects 
of development ‘aid’ on local 
institutions have been widely 
criticised. For example many 
interventions that targeted subsi-
dies to the poor, while often fall-
ing prey to selection biases and 
not reaching the original target 
group (which can make the ex-
cluded even worse off), often had 
negative influences on existing 
norms and networks of mutual 
support. Those who benefited 
from the intervention had less 
incentive to abide by local norms 
of mutual support than those who 
were excluded and depended on 
these arrangements. A temporary 
intervention would leave many of 
those institutions of mutual sup-
port irreversibly damaged when 
the activities were discontinued 
(see for example, Ostrom, 1994; 
Sandefur and Lauman, 1998; 
Woolcock, 1998).
23 Klitgaard (1994) uses the 
illustrative image of socio-cul-
tural soil conditions to refer to 
the nature of the institutional 
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and the local institutional environment plays an important role, especially in 
the early stages of the development intervention. To understand this proc-
ess it is necessary to deconstruct the concept of development intervention. 
Secondly, the specific intervention strategies that development interventions 
employ determine the scope and path of local change. The effects of any 
intervention strategy involve complex processes of change. Finally, there are 
a number of design and implementation principles that as a whole deter-
mine the nature of the institutional innovation processes. Such design and 
implementation principles include the following elements: the participation 
of the local population in different phases of the development intervention; 
co-ordinated efforts between the public, private and collective action organi-
sations involved; local ownership of the relevant activities and resources; the 
nature of providing/targeting activities and resources; the intervention’s out-
reach in terms of the geographical and socio-economic focus and concentra-
tion of activities, etc. A further elaboration of these principles is beyond the 
scope of this paper, especially since there are no clear blueprints as to how 
the process of local institutional embeddedness and innovation had best be 
approached.
A discussion of specific design and implementation principles is also 
beyond the scope of this paper. However, we do consider it important here 
to obtain at least a basic view of the concept development intervention from 
an institutional perspective. The next section deals with the issue of decon-
structing the concept of development intervention. The subsequent section 
will outline the main strategies or mechanisms with regard to promoting 
local institutional change.
4.2.1.Deconstructing local development intervention
“The concept of intervention needs deconstructing so that we 
recognise it for what it fundamentally is, namely, an ongoing, socially-con-
structed and negotiated process, not simply the execution of an already-
specified plan of action with expected outcomes” (Long and Van der Ploeg, 
1989: 228).
In this paper, we limit our observations to development interventions 
involving a physical presence at the local level (hence excluding the national 
and regional policy environment that affects the local level). We assume that 
local development interventions involve a specific activity or group of activi-
ties with a starting point and a finishing point (or continued over a period), 
and intended to accomplish a specific (range of) objective(s). Development 
interventions at the local level are carried out by organisations which focus 
on a specific project or manage a portfolio of different projects. Local devel-
opment interventions are state (e.g. an extension office), private (e.g. external 
NGO) and collective action (e.g. co-operatives) organisations that operate at 
the level of the group, community or locality (the local level).24
24 In this paper, the terms 
development intervention, 
organisation and project are used 
indiscriminately to refer to the 
same concept. On the concept of 
“locality”, see Bastiaensen and 
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Each development project inevitably becomes part of the local insti-
tutional environment. Upon initiating work in a certain locality, new social 
structures of intra-project interaction and project-community interaction are 
brought about. Local people are hired, meetings are organised, resources 
and/or services are provided, etc. External rules (procedures, regulations, 
values,...) meet local rules. Implicit and explicit bargaining processes arise 
within the project, between the project and the local population and among 
the local population; these will determine the control over and the allocation 
of project resources and the effectiveness and (indirect) effects of project 
activities with regard to the locality. Each project represents a potential for 
institutional innovation because through its specific articulation with the 
local population and its activities it affects the way people interact and think 
about each other, themselves and their livelihoods. The potential for institu-
tional innovation might not be realised however, in that the project cannot 
but confirm and strengthen established practices and modes of thinking.
The definition, implementation and evaluation of development 
projects involve a number of stakeholders who differ in terms of objectives 
and the degree of control over the project. The simplest distinction between 
stakeholders is between project staff and the intended beneficiaries. Howev-
er, such a distinction probably does little justice to reality, in that the devel-
opment organisation often consists of several groups of stakeholders, each 
with explicitly or implicitly different strategies. For example, there might be 
considerable differences between the objectives and attitudes of the regular 
field staff (who might be local people) and the management of the project. 
Moreover, the local population does not consist of a homogenous group of 
possible beneficiaries, but is likely to consist of different subgroups and 
people with different socio-cultural characteristics and different levels of 
wealth and power and hence different interests vis-à-vis a specific develop-
ment intervention.25
To be more specific, the project should be treated as a social space 
within which the existing social structure will be developed, contested, 
negotiated and rethought. Concomitantly, “we should expect an inclusive 
public sphere to be fairly messy and conflict-ridden, a focus for discontents. 
That is one of its most important functions. Access to public debate and a 
valuing of plurality and dispute are core elements of a “socially inclusive 
process” (Mackintosh, 2000: 91). On the other hand, the social space pro-
vided by the project should of course be more, rather than less, inclusive in 
comparison to the local institutional environment.
The performance (e.g. outreach) and impact of the project in a given 
locality are determined by the balance between the specific synergy between 
project and local community on the one hand and the internal integrity of 
the project on the other (see section 3.3). The latter factor refers to the ability 
of the project to become a sufficiently independent, capable and fair actor in 
the locality and not to fall prey to local power dynamics. The former refers 
to establishing inclusive and participatory relationships with the local com-
munity.
25 For a critique of the idea of 
the homogenous local commu-
nity see for example Agrawal 
and Gibson (1999), Leach et al. 
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In general, both concepts - integrity and synergy- constitute the es-
sence of the articulation between intervention and locality and encompass 
most of the points dealt with in this section. In the light of deconstructing 
development intervention and assessing the perspectives from which contri-
butions to local institutional change processes can be made, time and effort 
should be devoted to further translating them into operational issues that can 
be studied and taken into account in project planning and implementation. 
4.2.2. Strategies for promoting local institutional change
In this section we will briefly discuss a range of strategies 
directly or indirectly aimed at influencing local institutions. Some strate-
gies are specifically directed at the poor while others aim to cover the local 
population as a whole. We distinguish three types of strategies, which can 
be located in several parts of the institutional map (see figure 4 below). Our 
classification aims to unravel some of the complexities of the causal relation-
ships between development intervention and institutional change. The differ-
ent strategies should not be seen as exhaustive, nor as mutually exclusive. In 
practice, combinations of these strategies will be found in one and the same 
development project.
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1. Providing/targeting resources
The immediate reflex when pondering how to fight poverty is perhaps 
to consider interventions which provide ‘basic needs’ resources. Such an ap-
proach would imply a rather indirect strategy of institutional change. Out-
reach and the sustainability of the intervention, to mention only two major 
design principles, are crucial in the causal relationship between the transfer 
of resources and local institutional changes.
It is useful to distinguish between transferring or targeting private 
goods and providing public or toll goods. 
With respect to private goods, access to resources improves the 
capabilities of the poor. Transferring resources to the poor improves their 
bargaining position vis-à-vis other local stakeholders (e.g. moneylenders, 
landlords) and might lead to structural changes in the relationships between 
the poor and other groups. In other words, transferring resources to the poor 
is a potentially powerful tool in fostering (through the improved capabilities 
of the poor) sustainable beneficial changes in the institutional environment 
that will sustain improved entitlements to resources for the poor.
The question remains whether or not the transfer of resources only 
has temporary effects. Without a closer examination of the institutional 
change which accompanies this transfer of resources, this question can-
not be answered. It should be stressed that the prospects for a sustainable 
influence on the poor will depend to a large extent on whether a project 
constitutes a (permanent) institutional innovation that generates continuous 
access to additional resources. In addition, there might be a hidden contra-
diction in the logic of the project intervention, as on the one hand it tries to 
increase people’s capabilities (by transferring resources to the poor) while 
on the other hand, by doing just that, it confirms people’s dependency on the 
project. Another problematic issue with regard to the transfer of resources 
to the poor is the danger of adverse selection and targeting failure in general 
(e.g. Van de Walle, 1998). 
An often less problematic alternative to projects of resource transfer 
to the poor would be to focus on specific deprivations in capability that are 
most suffered by the poor but also by other non-poor people. The provision 
of public goods (roads, communal wells,...) or toll goods (electricity, health 
care centres,...) in principle improves the capabilities of communities as a 
whole, including those of  the poor. For example, a project that concentrates 
on education and health services is in fact targeting a specific cause of pov-
erty which might have relatively more significant effects on the livelihoods 
of the poor but which would at the same time also benefit the non-poor -and 
thus cause the latter to be interested in the service as well (e.g. Sen, 1995). 
However, poverty being a multidimensional concept, an institution which 
tries to support one particular capability should be aware that access to the 
services it provides may be restricted by the existence of other deprivations 
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Preferably, public good projects should be combined with for example 
collective organisation building or educational efforts - i.e. by strategies of 
direct institutional change. Such activities can strengthen the maintenance 
of public goods as well as constitute incipient paths of local institutional 
change.
2. Empowerment
Although the former types of interventions could as a matter of fact 
be categorised as ‘empowerment’ as well, given that they focus on increas-
ing individual capabilities, we propose using the concept to group strategies 
aimed at strengthening the institutional capacity of vulnerable groups. An 
important task for external development intervention indeed lies in facili-
tating organisational processes involving the poor. This group of strategies 
focuses on organising the poor in new groups and organisations or support-
ing and facilitating existing processes of organisation among the poor. The 
provision of legal services, infra-structural facilities, or other resources to 
new local groups are examples of the latter. Beyond that, the most vulner-
able sectors of society often cannot be reached as individuals, therefore they 
need institutional advocates to speak for them (Mackintosh, 2000: 88). 
Facilitating the organisation of the poor goes hand in hand with differ-
ent processes of education (see for example Uphoff and Wijayaratna, 2000: 
1879). Activities like the promotion of formal education, popular education 
(practical topics), meetings to strengthen the awareness of local groups of 
their cultural identities (thereby strengthening the self-confidence and pride 
of vulnerable groups) can contribute to empowering the poor or strengthen-
ing cooperation between local stakeholders. 
3. Community building 
Community building can also be characterised by the promotion and 
facilitation of co-operation and dialogue between different groups. In many 
local communities, conflict rather than co-operation is the rule. On the other 
hand, as a working hypothesis it is maintained that key actors are tied to 
each other in a situation of cooperative conflict (Drèze and Sen, 1989), their 
interests being partly convergent, partly divergent. A development interven-
tion should be aware of these differences in interests in the first place in 
order to avoid the deflection of project objectives. These conflicts and dif-
ferent interests should be made explicit in order to work towards co-opera-
tive solutions in function of local development (Johnson and Wilson, 2000).  
Subsequently, an active negotiation framework should be established that 
will work towards win-win solutions (Leeuwis, 2000). The two essential 
requisites for local negotiation are the perception of mutual interdependence 
and the ability to communicate (ibid.). With respect to the latter, in strongly 
divided back-to-back communities it is often very difficult to establish 
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To be sure, community building is not about getting the community 
to act as one body. Such an objective would be impossible to achieve if we 
take seriously the claims that on the one hand, “no actor, whatever his or 
her position, will ever allow to be reduced to a mere instrumental role in the 
service of other actors” (Foudriat et al., 2000: 511), and, on the other, that 
each player’s view is bound to be partial in the double sense of objectively 
and subjectively biased. From these suppositions, it must follow that the 
approach is limited to connecting or re-connecting the various partial views 
which are represented and defended by different key players and does not 
aim to streamline every single one of these views and integrate them into a 
unified, externally imposed concept of development or well-being. Develop-
ment is not so much a process of learning new things as of un-learning or 
re-interpreting old patterns and ideas (Kozakaï, 2000).
 Moreover, the practice of community building should not be limited 
to setting up meetings and seminars. As we have already pointed out above, 
institutional change is a public good and as such it is prone to under-invest-
ment and free-riding behaviour. Another way of working towards change in 
current practices and perceptions might be to try to induce a ‘system shock’ 
and show the population that the present way of doing things is indeed 
‘problematic’.26
However, ensuring the participation of all key stakeholders in the 
exercise of community building is not sufficient since “the more powerful 
may exert and extend their ‘power over’ during participatory and partner-
ship processes” (Johnson and Wilson, 2000: 1892). It is indeed often difficult 
for powerful local groups to acknowledge the potential gains of co-operat-
ing with weaker and vulnerable groups. Therefore, community building and 
empowerment should be considered in combination rather than as alterna-
tives between which an agency should choose.
26 In Nicaragua, for example, this 
activity is sometimes informally 
referred to as patear el perro 
(literally: kicking (or waking up) 
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Annex I. Comparative governance advantages of different
institutional sectors
A major advantage of the institutional trinity approach as set out in 
3.2. is that it helps to  stimulate theoretical reflection on the comparative 
governance advantages of the different institutional sectors. The main pur-
pose is to reflect upon the institutional design of project and policy inter-
ventions, in particular with respect to the question as to which institutional 
players had best be made responsible - and how they should be combined in 
order to optimise the provision of the different types of goods and services.
The point of departure for establishing the typology of goods is the 
well-established theoretical efficiency advantage of the free market as a 
decentralised coordinating and information processing mechanism.27 From 
this point of departure it follows that (state or non-governmental) develop-
ment interventions should be very reluctant to substitute for the market 
provision of goods and services and should always prefer to contribute to 
the creation of new and/or more perfect markets whenever private market 
delivery fails in practice. It should be underlined, however, that this theoreti-
cal and practical superiority of the free market only applies to the provision 
of private goods and on condition that appropriate institutional foundations 
for an acceptable functioning of the real market (free flow of information, 
independence of transacting parties,...) are in place (Picciotto, 1995; Sen, 
1999). Both the state and the collective action sector have a crucial role to 
play in creating and sustaining appropriate foundations for the functioning 
of the market. In the terminology of Picciotto, they respectively provide for 
essential government and civil goods.  
1. Government goods (e.g. policy implementation, enforcement of 
the law,...) concern a number of fundamental services provided by the state 
in order to guarantee an acceptable performance of a free market economy. 
Examples of such essential goods are the administration of commercial law, 
the implementation of social and environmental regulations and the manage-
ment of social safety nets. The provision of these services requires top-down 
expert knowledge as well as independence and integrity. It is therefore best 
to have them supplied by an autonomous state administration, provided it is 
governed by appropriate management and incentive systems.28 In practice, 
the provision of these goods requires the presence of a state administration 
capable of effectively implementing government policies,29 as well as a well-
defined, reliable and morally sound justice and police system. 
2. Civil goods (e.g. civic action, mobilising public opinion, defini-
tion and maintenance of professional standards,...) are activities and services 
directed towards “exhorting, motivating, and restraining the actions of the 
state, and [...] calling attention to the excesses of free and unrestrained mar-
kets” (Picciotto, 1995: 10). All of these have in common that they require 
interaction between more than one sector. Depending on the activity, this 
27 This indisputable theoretical 
characteristic of the free market 
follows from the ‘Fundamental 
Theorem of Welfare Econom-
ics’ (e.g. Milgrom and Roberts, 
1992).
28 Besides the theoretical com-
parative governance advantages 
of each sector, there remains 
of course, within each sector, 
a problem or challenge of ap-
propriate, effective and efficient 
internal management practices.
29 The definition of the policy 
itself is however a public good 
which requires a mix of state and 
collective action engagement 
in order to reach an adequate 
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will be between the market and the collective action sector (e.g. profes-
sional standards, facilitation of organisational processes) or between the 
state and the collective action sector (e.g. lobbying and advocacy work). The 
goods and services that refer to the latter interaction can also be regarded as 
(semi)-public goods instead of as civic goods.
When appropriate levels of government and civil goods are provided 
the free market has a clear governance advantage in the provisioning of 
private goods. Besides these types of goods, there are however three other 
types of goods with regard to whose provision the market sector does not 
have a natural comparative advantage. Leaving government and civil goods 
aside, figure 5 summarises the conditions of four different types of goods, 
categorised according to the two criteria of excludability and subtractability.
Figure 5. Types of Goods
Source:  adapted from Picciotto (1995).
3. Private goods (e.g. food, machinery, credit,...). These types of 
goods are characterised by subtractability (consumption of the good/service 
by one person diminishes its availability to others) and excludability (access 
to the good/service can be denied to other users/consumers at an acceptable 
cost). The provision of these goods and services will be optimally guaran-
teed by decentralised coordination in the free market. Competing private 
enterprises or entrepreneurs are thus the most efficient suppliers of these 
goods.
4. Common pool goods (e.g. collective pastures, forests, irriga-
tion water,...). These goods are subtractable but lack excludability. In other 
words, consumption by one person depletes the total availability of the 
stock, while at the same time it is too difficult or costly to exclude individual 
users from access to the resource. Since people can access these goods 
without having to pay for them, the market is not an appropriate mechanism 
to govern the supply and demand of these goods. It is indeed impossible to 
put a price on the utilisation of these resources, because non-excludability 
implies that users can easily ‘free-ride’. As a consequence, the aggregation 
of decentralised individual self-interested behaviour almost inevitably leads 
to over-exploitation of such resources. Following the well-known ‘tragedy 
of the commons’ (e.g. Hardin, 1968) and ‘logic of collective action’ (e.g. 
Olson, 1965) arguments, individual users will have incentives to overuse 
common resources, since they reap the full benefits of overutilisation, while 
sharing the negative consequences of such behaviour with all other users 
(Ostrom, 1990: 2-8). This traps resource users in a Prisoner’s Dilemma situ-
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ation, where the pursuit of their individual interest (over-utilisation) leads 
to collective disaster. Hierarchical governance (e.g. rationing and policing 
resource utilisation by the state) is a first option when remedies for such 
‘market’ failure are considered. However, without the active participation of 
the resource users themselves, such a hierarchical policing agent often faces 
irremediable information problems (i.e. with respect to how much of the 
resource can be used in total, who uses the resource, when and how much) 
(Ostrom, 1990: 11-2). This implies that the governance of the utilisation of 
common pool resources had best be organised by the (local) collective ac-
tion sector, i.e. with a large degree of local participation in the definition and 
enforcement of resource utilisation rules.
5. Public goods (e.g. national defence, rural roads, economic 
policy,...). These are goods and services that lack both subtractability and 
excludability. Since the benefits of investments in these goods cannot be 
appropriated individually (no price can be charged), private initiative in the 
market will inevitably lead to an undersupply of these goods and services. In 
addition, the lack of subtractability makes it useless to organise (local) users 
to safeguard individual utilisation rights, since consumption has no effect on 
the total availability of public goods or services. As a consequence of both 
these elements, hierarchical governance by the state has to play a major role 
in the provisioning of public goods. Of course, since nobody can be asked to 
pay a price for these goods, the danger of poor or inadequate quality supply 
as well as the excessive cost of provisioning are facts that have to be con-
sidered. Needless to say, the performance of state administrations remains 
an issue. Sometimes, this drawback can be overcome by directly involving 
other institutional players in the provisioning of the good. As a result, a vari-
ety of hybrid arrangements, ranging from co-production to state production 
with civil participation, will come about. Sometimes, the performance of 
the state administration will be kept in check largely by internal sanctioning 
mechanisms and, ultimately, by public participation in the political process-
es governing states. It is essential for the process of the state supply of public 
goods  to be monitored by agents with sufficient political clout. 
6. Toll goods or club goods (e.g. sewage systems, toll roads,...). These 
goods lack subtractability but are excludable. The latter implies that a price 
can be charged to individual users and that non-payers can be excluded). 
They are most adequately provided by a combination of the market and hier-
archy. Hierarchy is needed to determine and guarantee the rule system that 
governs supply and demand with regard to toll goods. Once a sufficiently 
stable and credible rule system is in place, private enterprises can subse-
quently be expected to be the most efficient providers for such goods.
Picciotto’s tentative framework of the basic principles of comparative 
institutional advantages is summarised in Figure 6. A final important com-
ment needs to be made here. For the performance of economic, social and 
political processes to be appropriate, the different sectors and their respec-44 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-06 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-06 • 45
tive activities have to interact and be complementary. In other words, there 
is also a theoretical need for the attainment of some kind of global institu-
tional coherence. This requirement may imply that partial institutional opti-
mality (according to the theoretical comparative advantages) may rationally 
need to be sacrificed in order to reach a higher level of global coherence. For 
example, we can accept the theoretical advantage of the free market in the 
provision of private goods. It is in fact based on a mathematically formulated 
theorem that can be proved unequivocally. However, we also know that the 
free market requires a number of institutional conditions (global policy, in-
dependent and articulated justice system) that are often not met in practice. 
This can imply for example that for a number of strategic private goods (e.g. 
food staples), state supply might represent the best attainable (in a ‘second 
best’ sense) institutional option despite its theoretical and practical deficien-
cies. As has been pointed out above, Picciotto’s framework of comparative 
institutional advantage should therefore not be used as a simple checklist to 
determine the optimal institutional location of activities, but rather as a flex-
ible conceptual tool to guide reflection on choices of institutional players.
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